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Youth Political Engagement and Democratic Culture in
Republican Nepal

Tom O’Neill
Bijay Raj Poudel
Nabin Maharjan

Nepal’s transformation from an autocratic
monarchy to a democratic republic presupposes
the development of democratic institutions,
and the current generation of Nepali youth,
particularly those in higher education, are
uniquely situated in that process. As such, Nepali
youth constitute a distinct generation. In the
past, eforts to mobilize Nepalese youth have
been aimed at integrating them as useful assets
in the service of Nepalese political institutions,
such as political student unions, but in this paper,
based on feldwork and interview data collected
in 2013 and 2016, we argue that politically
active youth today should be understood as an
autonomous though heterogeneous constituent
force that is in counterpoint with normative
political institutions.
Keywords: Nepal, democratic politics, youth political
engagement.
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Introduction
University campuses and the political student unions
that flourish on them have long been arenas of political
antagonism that both reflect and refract Nepal’s political struggles. As an example, in May 2013 the high level
political mechanism that comprised Nepal’s four largest
political parties proposed appointing Lokman Singh
Karki to a six-year term as head of the Commission for
the Investigation of the Abuse of Authority (CIAA), an independent constitutional body charged with investigating private and public sector corruption. Karki had been
a controversial figure since his entry into civil service
where he occupied several key positions, eventually becoming a chief secretary in the last government of King
Gyanendra. According to many students, Karki played a
key role in the attempt to violently suppress the second
people’s movement and was himself an exemplar abuser
of authority. Karki’s candidacy was initially challenged
by some of the government partners, but all four parties
eventually approved him to head the CIAA. The student
unions representing these political parties on campus
did not, and called for a bandh (political strike) to protest
the appointment. The planned strike showed remarkable cooperation between student groups that had been
known to be sometimes violently antagonistic to each
other. Students joined in protesting their opposition
both to a controversial figure from the past and to the
resolve of their superiors to pursue the politics of corruption and patronage as usual. The afternoon before
the bandh was to go into effect, however, word came

down from the parties that Karki’s appointment had been
decided, and the university directed the student unions
to call off the strike. Though the student unions were
silenced, the incident showed that political antagonisms in
Nepal persist not only between political parties with their
ideologies, but also between youth and previous generations of their political elders.
Nepal’s painful transformation from an authoritarian
monarchy to a fledgling democracy has been marked by
political antagonism, both within the state legislature
and, frequently, outside of it. We take this antagonism as
an essential feature of Nepali politics, drawing on Chantal
Mouffe’s insight (2000; 2005) that the struggle between
competing hegemonies is a fundamental aspect of the
political. Youth political engagement in Nepal is similarly
antagonistic. They perform the political as cadres in student unions, in ethnic organizations, and as non-partisan
actors in civil society. But, though they pursue diverse
political goals, they constitute a distinct social field as a
generation due to their historical location. Most Nepali
youth today were born after the Jana Andolan (People’s
Movement) of 1990 ended the absolute authority of the
monarchy and established a parliamentary democracy. They were children during the years of the Maoist
‘People’s War’ that culminated in a Loktantra Andolan
(Democratic Movement) in 2006 that established Nepal as
a republic. Now, as young adults, they are being called on
to engage with democratic institutions that are relatively
new, unstable, and are rooted in the politics of the past. As
we argue below, it is crucial that the institutions through
which the political views of youth compete become normative, and protected by the state. This makes understanding youth political engagement in those institutions
all the more important.
This paper is a collaboration between a cultural anthropologist with extensive experience with Nepali youth
laborers, and two Nepali youths who are each engaged
with forms of social activism. We conducted focus group
research during fieldwork at Tribhuvan University (TU)
in April and May 2013 with members from four student
unions that represented branches of the major political
parties that constituted the political mechanism governing the country (Communist Party of Nepal, Unified
Marxist-Leninist; Nepali Congress; Communist Party of
Nepal, Maoist; and the Madhesi People’s Forum). Tribhuvan University is Nepal’s oldest national higher education institution and is attended by students from across
Nepal. Although the city of Kirtipur, where it is located,
is part of the intensely urbanized Kathmandu Valley, TU
students are not an urban elite, as they represent a select

few who continue their studies there based on their own
merit. Such a student body is fertile recruiting ground
for competing political parties not only because they are
considered Nepal’s best and brightest, but also because
many will return to their regions with political as well as
professional formation. We intentionally recruited students who were not leaders in these unions, and organized
several mixed focus groups with students from different
union groups. Interviews were also conducted off campus
with members of the Association of Youth Organizations,
Nepal (AYON), as well as from indigenous organizations in
order to get alternative perspectives on campus politics.
More recently, interviews were conducted with eighteen
student union leaders and young civil society activists with
Skype software in the summer of 2016. The spring of 2013
was a significant time for student political activists. With
national elections to a new Constituent Assembly (CA) only
a few months off and more immediate elections to the
university student council imminent, the activity of unions
competing for young supporters was at a fever pitch. By
2016, when the second set of interviews was collected, the
CA elections had been held, producing a dramatic result.
In addition, Nepal suffered a disastrous earthquake in
the spring of 2015, and a newly elected CA promulgated
a revised constitution later that year. The purpose of the
research was, broadly, to understand the dynamics of
youth political engagement in constitutional and issues
of governance in Nepal as an emerging democracy. Youth
political engagement is conceptualized here as a discrete
phenomenon, distinguished from, but in counterpoint to,
dominant, formal political processes in Nepal.
During our research, we interviewed young people about
their participation in Nepal’s politics, their understanding of current political processes, and their hopes for
Nepal’s future (O’Neill 2016). Some students were directly
mobilized by the political parties, others were searching
for alternatives to the dominant political culture, while
others sought to ignore the political realm altogether,
which is difficult as Nepal’s divisive political culture
permeates many educational institutions and professional
organizations. One of the questions we asked them was
to recall the first time in their lives that they were aware
of rajniti (politics), a concept which we allowed students
to interpret freely. Many students, both male and female,
recalled being motivated by traumatic experiences during
the political violence of Nepal’s recent past, or the social
injustice they encountered as caste or ethnic minorities,
or charismatic political leaders who promised democracy
and development. At the same time, it was clear that many
regarded contemporary politics as ‘dirty,’ characterized
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by patrimonialism, corruption, self-interest, and incompetence. Young people in Nepal today are torn between their
idealism and the shortcomings of democratic institutions
that have only recently claimed constitutional legitimacy.
Nepali youth constitute a distinct generation because
of their shared experience of Nepal’s recent turbulence.
Karl Mannheim, in his formative essay: “The Problem of
Generations” (1964 [1952]), understood generations as
concrete groups that share an empirical reality as a demographic cohort. These then share “interpretive formative
principles” that produce social and cultural innovation,
including those in the political sphere (1964 [1952]: 306).
Recently, Mannheim has been used as a starting point for
understanding how young people’s “fresh contact”
(ibid: 293) with their cultural heritage may produce significant shifts in the dispositions of youth that may then
shape their overall social and political development (Cole
2007; Ben-Ze’ev and Lomsky-Feder 2009; O’Donnell 2010;
O’Neill 2015; Kublitz 2016; Snellinger 2018a). Edmunds and
Turner (2005) suggest that distinctions can be drawn between passive cohorts and active generations that are conscious of their critical role as youth. They argue that in the
1960s the mediated experience of television, which broadcast anti-colonial and civil rights struggles as well as the
Vietnam war to millions of youth, made a ‘global generation’ possible. More recently Nigam (2012) argues that viral
revolutions of youth, as exemplified by the Arab Spring
movements which spread from Tunisia to Egypt, Syria and
beyond in part because of their mediation through social
media, were spread throughout the world because of youth
rejection of the formal political institutions that oppressed
them (see also Jeffrey 2013).
While youth have played an important role in the political transformation of parts of Africa and the Middle East,
scholars have noted their relative absence in the established democracies of the global north, where youth political participation in normative institutions, at least, seems
to be on the wane (Youniss 2009; Sloam 2012). Institutions
like political parties then tend to ignore youth concerns,
which only deepens their disaffection (Mycock and Tonge
2012). On the other hand, youth disengagement with normative politics may be due to their engagement with social
movements that more accurately embrace their aspirations, which follows Ulrich Beck’s argument that youth
disengagement “actually produces the orientations and
prerequisites which, if anything can, will put this society in
a position to master the future” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim
2002: 161; see also Banaji 2008; Farthing 2010). Other scholars suggest that political youth activism in social and/or
protest movements may be an alternative to normative
politics (Rheingans and Holland 2013).
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In our view, politics necessarily involves the normative
institutions—political parties, constituent assemblies, parliaments, and constitutional governance—through which
social antagonisms are mediated. Ignoring these normative
institutions and how youth are mobilized and engaged
through them risks undervaluing the unique contribution
that youth are making to Nepal’s political development.
Nepali youth played a major role in the series of movements that forced changes to these institutions. Currently,
many Nepali youth claim a ‘post-political’ orientation that
seems to turn away from formal government (Snellinger
2016; Hindman 2014), but they remain far more politically
engaged than youth in the global north. The overall participation rates of 69% in the most recent national election (compared to much lower rates in most of the Global
North) show that, despite demonstrations of frustration
and protestations of a-politicism, many of them vote. As
we argue, this political engagement does not mean that
they accept the status quo; it means that they see these
institutions as a pragmatic necessity in mediating political
antagonisms in post-conflict Nepal.
This paper is divided into four sections. In the first, we
focus on youth political engagement as it has unfolded
in Nepal’s transformation to democracy, and argue that
their political engagement with normative democratic
institutions is crucial to Nepal’s political sustainability. The
second section explores how that engagement has been
objectified in national youth policy as a transformative
force. The next section describes the patrimonial political
culture that characterizes normative institutions, and the
final section discusses youth engagement in identity politics as they played out in constitutional debates. Overall,
we argue that the critical distance youth maintain from
traditional political culture is potentially transformative.
Youth and Democratic Politics
Youth have played an important role in democratic
movements throughout Nepal’s history. During the jayatu
sanskritam (Sanskrit school) movement in 1947, a student demonstration against the autocratic Rana regime
contributed to its overthrow three years later (Dahal
2001). A student uprising against the absolute rule of
then King Birendra forced further reforms in 1980, and
youth participation was key in the people’s movements of
1990 and 2006 that led to the establishment of Nepal as a
democratic republic (Einsedel, Malone, and Pradhan 2012).
Democratic institutions are imperfect, evolving and subject to manipulation by powerful elites, but they provide
a framework for progressive change. The critical distance
that Nepali youth bring to bear on democratic institutions
has the potential to transform them from within, and

even the avowed a-politicism of many youth is a silent interlocution into normative political debate. But, each time
the regimes that emerged following these protest movements tended to reproduce the political structures of the
past. In contemporary Nepal, political elites continue to
be drawn from what some scholars call a “caste hill Hindu
elite” of brahmin and chhetri castes that provided soldiers
and administrators for the previous autocratic regimes
(Lawoti and Hangen 2012: 9). This continues to fuel the
resentment from Nepal’s untouchable castes and ethnic
communities that have been exploited by Maoist insurgents, who have mobilized them against the government,
and which recently led to sporadic violence among the
linguistically distinct madhesi peoples in the south of the
country. Nepal’s indigenous peoples, the adivasi janajati,
have also been excluded from political decision making,
and have been culturally discriminated against by its
elites (Hachhethu 2003).
When the Republic of Nepal was finally established in 2007,
the hegemony of the past was swept aside, and various
counter-hegemonic visions of how to renew Nepal came
into contention. Youth have been mobilized by all of these
contentious groups through student unions that represent
the political parties, including those championing madhesi
and adivasi janajati minorities, as well professional organizations, paramilitary groups, and other partisan agencies These groups are mobilized to pursue their broader
political goals, rather than the interest of youth themselves. Their primary aim is to cultivate youth as political
cadres and future leaders. Political youth activists are also
relied on to participate in demonstrations, and may also
serve as muscle power to enforce coercive tactics such as
strikes, forced ‘donations,’ and the intimidation of political
opponents. Many political parties, even those representing minority interests, are riven by patrimonial figures
who demand an almost blind loyalty from their followers,
ensuring that political antagonism that exists between
groups are also a factor within them (Hangen 2010; Pandey
2012). There is a growing conviction among Nepali youth
that the political culture of the past needs to change.
Democracy is crucial for reforming these structures of
domination, and has been demanded, repeatedly, by the
people of Nepal. Democratic institutions are symbolic
spaces where agreements on how to resolve political
antagonism can be brokered. Chantal Mouffe argues
that antagonism as an essential feature of politics, as the
struggle between competing hegemonies is a fundamental
aspect of that which she describes as the political (2000,
2005). Youth in Nepal become political through youth
organizations mobilized by political parties which are keen
to spread their power and influence over the electorate in

anticipation of general elections. At the same time, many
youth appear to be suspicious of these normative institutions, and are looking for alternatives. They share this
skepticism with many contemporary scholars, who argue
that parliamentary democracies fail to empower citizens
because dominant elites monopolize these institutions
in their own interests. Nira Yuval-Davis, for example,
argues that “there is no real power-sharing in parliamentary democracies in which people give up their sense of
political power, the ability to affect political decisions, to a
detached grouping of supposed representatives” (2011: 51).
This view is representative of a broader trend that argues
that political activists should withdraw from the institutions of modernity in order to lay the groundwork for a
more comprehensive global transformation. Mouffe (2013),
however, insists on the importance of democratic institutions. She is particularly critical of theorists such as Hardt
and Negri (2000) and Virno (2004), who advocate abandoning modern political institutions, because the chaos that
ensues too often leaves the field open for non-progressive
forces to reassert themselves.
Democratic institutions are, in theory, legitimate forums
for voicing antagonism in a struggle for political hegemony, yet in Nepal these institutions lack this legitimacy
because until recently they failed to contest alternative
models for political organization in the post-conflict period. Amanda Snellinger (2018a) argues that democratic institutions in Nepal have always been tentative, unfinished,
and resistant to sharing power with those marginalized by
powerful elites. In opposition to the constitutional consensus that the leaders of political parties have attempted
to broker, she argues that youth activists are engaged in
a generative dissensus that will eventually lead back to
political movements and away from formal institutions.
But, after suffering a ten-year civil war in which 17,000
people lost their lives, and with simmering ethnic tension
between Nepal’s marginalized madhesi and adivasi janajati
communities and its dominant elites threatening even
more violence, a constitutional consensus that provides a
framework for legitimating political adversity seems worth
working towards. Nepali youth have been assigned a role
to play in this nation making, but many are choosing to
play this role in opposition to the ways of their masters.
Nepal’s Youth Policy
Generations are patterns of relations between the young
and the old, and a category analogous to gender, class,
race, and ethnicity for social analysis because they play an
important role in social and cultural reproduction. Youth
as a category must be understood as intersecting with others. Jennifer Cole (2007: 78) warns that “emphasizing the
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concepts of both youth culture and youth agency…runs
the risk of fetishizing and reifying the category of youth,
separating youth from the families and communities in
which they live.” The goal here is not to separate, but to
draw out the distinct features of youth engagement with
the emerging Nepali state. Also, the reification of youth
as a category is not merely academic, as Nepal’s political
actors are aware that youth as a demographic is ripe for
mobilization.
The introduction of a National Youth Policy and Youth
Ministry in 2010 was a blueprint for that mobilization. The
first few sentences of that policy make it plain that youth
are to play a critical role in the new Nepal:
The youth force is an invaluable asset of the nation.
The youth is not only a vital source of the state but
also a change agent. The youths are pioneers of
economic, social, political and cultural transformation and change driving force. This class remains as
an important asset of the nation because of courage, innovativeness, inquisitiveness and high level
of self-confidence, which is also considered to be
a main source of nation building. (National Youth
Policy 2010).
The 2010 youth policy covers a lot of ground. It set goals
for youth entrepreneurship along with social justice
objectives such as the elimination of caste, class, and
gender discrimination. It proposes a number of initiatives
aimed at promoting employment and innovation in agro
industries, including the establishment of cooperatives
in urban as well as rural areas, and proposes programs to
assist Nepali youth working abroad. It also hints at measures of positive discrimination that would bring Nepal’s
marginalized into the mainstream, and broaden access to
secondary and post-secondary education that still remains
practically closed to many youths today. Finally, it establishes a new government body to implement the policy:
the National Youth Council that will include leaders from
the Ministry of Youth and Sport, as well as youth leaders
from all of the political parties and the proportionate
representation of women and from the madhesi, adivasi
janajati, and dalit communities.
For all of its ambition, the National Youth Policy lacks
specific outcome measures and offers no coherent priorities by which its vast agenda could be realized. At numerous points, for example, the document refers to “various
programs” that will be launched to meet the policies
objectives, but there is no description of these, no timeline
in which they will be implemented, and few concrete ways
by which program success could be assessed. In addition,
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meeting many of the Youth Policy objectives would be
dependent on broader governmental reforms in other
legislative sectors. For example, both of the objectives to
make secondary education free and compulsory, or to ensure equal pay for equal work would require policy change
beyond the mandate of the Ministry of Youth and Sports.
The shortcomings of the previous policy were well known
to the committee drafting the 2016 revision, but any policy
needs to be proposed within a climate in which its implementation is a clear possibility (Snellinger 2018b). In the
uncertainty generated by a prolonged constitutional crises
after the Constituent Assembly was disbanded in 2012, that
climate was changed.
Most of the Nepali youth we have spoken to were not
familiar with the 2010 Youth Policy. While there was some
awareness about the existence of the policy, and also of
the fact the government has produced a recent revision of
the document, few knew of any measures taken that are
consistent with the original policy. Even leaders of political
student unions who had representatives on the National
Youth Council were unfamiliar with it. One aspect of the
policy, well-known and problematic, was the definition of
youth as comprising those between the ages of sixteen and
forty. Amanda Snellinger (2018b) argues that the members
of the National Youth Council, many of whom were over
thirty years of age, favored this expanded age range in order
to assert their own authority in a socio-cultural context
in which their elders maintained a monopoly on power.
Many of the younger student union members complained
in focus group discussions that the category was so widely
defined as to become meaningless, as both parents and their
own children could be defined as youth under the policy.
This expanded age range also allowed older student union
leaders to maintain their grip on campus unions that were
stepping stones to higher positions in party hierarchies,
something that many of them resented. One student activist
with AYON complained: “how can a leader who is ten years
older understand the problems of a student who is ten years
younger at the university?” Recently, the Youth Council
itself has come under attack due to the perception that it
had failed to understand the needs of youth and had become
monopolized by cadres from one party to the exclusion of
others (The Kathmandu Post 2016).
Meaningful youth political mobilization is a prominent
objective of the policy, but, as with the document overall,
there are few suggestions as to how this will be achieved.
There is no mention of specific youth organizations,
political youth wings, or student unions. The policy seeks
to establish new ways of participation, and interestingly section six part ten reads: “various programs shall be

launched to prepare conscious youth force free from
distortions noticed in the economic, social, cultural and
political fields” as if admitting that existing institutions
are problematic, and placing the onus on younger generations to repair them. On these new, undistorted means
of national mobilization the policy is notably silent, and
existing youth political institutions sometimes reproduce
the less-than-democratic ways of their parent party.
In the period after the Loktantra Andolan, and particularly
after the collapse of the Constituent Assembly in 2013 due
to the political impasse over the nature of the new constitution, democratic institutions were viewed in an increasingly critical light and efforts to mobilize youth in traditional ways have proved less effective. This new critical
awareness has been amplified by the relative freedom by
the vernacular press in Nepal, the proliferation of information broadcast by independent FM stations (Kunreuther
2014), and through social media, all of which provide
alternative sources of information from which youth can
draw upon to develop their own lines of deliberation.
Although student union members often fell into line with
party positions regarding the constitution, federalism, and
post-conflict development in focus group discussions, it
was not uncommon to hear alternative views about political institutions once outside the earshot of union leaders.
In one focus group that included loosely affiliated members from various unions, one student remarked:
Where the problem lies in student politics is, for
example, I was in student politics when I was a student in the university but I gave it up for academic
career. What I realized that time was—it’s true that
politics is a dirty game [chuckle]. We came to know
that can one deal with political situation but the
question will be raised—who patronized you? Who
is the political leader that patronized you? In terms
of patronizing, people believe that an individual
climb higher and get promoted in their political
careers through foul play. So, since our childhood,
we heard politics is a dirty game.
The failure of the National Youth Policy to effectively mobilize youth reflects several problems of governance that
have plagued Nepal since the jana andolan (first people’s
movement). First is a rapid turnover in governments led by
coalitions of at times antagonistic political parties that tend
to stall the implementation of policies as new governments
pursue different priorities and the business of gaining and
maintaining political power becomes a central concern. The
policy, for example, was introduced by a Communist Party
of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) led government, but
this was replaced a year later by the government led by the

Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai which collapsed two years
later. Second, and even more problematically, is the highly
centralized nature of the state and its bureaucracy, which
is the cultural legacy of the patrimonial Panchayat regime
and the earlier autocratic Rana era. Policy decisions are
made by political elites at the center, that is, in Kathmandu, and disseminated to lower levels of governance to be
implemented, with those levels effectively excluded from
decision making processes. Finally, the Youth Policy was
intended to be a vehicle for the inclusion of the young political activists who played a front line role in Nepal’s recent
struggles, but those activists have aged, leaving them out of
touch with an emerging generation of youth.
Youth and Political Culture
The political practices of the past paradoxically remain part
of the repertoire of student union leaders. As an example,
only a month after completing research at Tribhuvan University, the planned election of new representatives to the
Free Student Union (FSU) (the council on which politically
affiliated unions compete for seats) was suspended by the
administration after it was found that many of the unions
had inflated their rolls with fraudulently obtained memberships. Student leaders anxious to prevail in the FSU election
did not wish to leave the outcome to chance, or to the choice
of individual student voters. This was a direct reflection of
the antagonism between the political parties, for, despite
the power sharing agreements at the highest levels, they
were also preparing for planned elections to a crucial second
Constituent Assembly that would determine the content of a
new constitution. Extending their influence among students in anticipation of those elections was a priority for the
leadership, but the methods with which they attempted to
accomplish this appeared to contradict the frequently voiced
student denunciation of political corruption.
Like the decision to call off the popular bandh against the
appointment of Lokman Singh Karki earlier that spring,
the fabrication of membership rolls was a practice that
originated in a union leadership that answered primarily
to party hierarchies rather than their membership. Campus-level unions report to a student Central Committee
that reports, in turn, to the party itself. Even local-level
union leaders were generally advanced students with
many of years of political experience, and appeared to be
on political career paths. A leader from one of the Communist Party unions told us that after obtaining a Bachelor
of Law, an MA in Education, and completing his PhD in
Linguistics, he will return to his district to take up politics
full time. Union leaders from other parties were in some
cases part time faculty members, and it was sometimes not
clear that they were students at all.
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In the summer of 2016, we spoke to a number of youth
leaders with the traditional political party campus unions,
the Maoist Young Communist League (YCL), the Association of Youth Organizations Nepal (AYON), and the new
youth-oriented party Bibiksheel Nepal, or ‘Responsible
Nepal’ (Hindman 2014). In the aftermath of the recent
promulgation of the 2015 constitution, many of these
youth leaders were pessimistic about the future and pointed to an underlying political culture that influenced the
behavior of most political institutions regardless of their
ideology. By political culture, they meant the patterns of
patrimonialism and corruption through which party positions and resources were allocated in political institutions.
A young YCL cadre and member of the National Youth
Council lamented:
Nepal is a country of possibility, but the political
parties are not able to utilize this opportunity.
Political parties are blamed for corruption and are
using resources to recruit their cadres rather than
give good governance to the people. Political parties
should leave this kind of political culture behind.
The perception that previous generations of political
leaders put their own interests and those of their clients
before the needs of national development was widely held
by both youth leaders and by student union members.
Section 6, paragraph 10 of 2010 Youth Policy, that reads
that conscious youth must be “free from the distortions”
that plague social political and economic fields reflects
that generational view. The patrimonialism and nepotism
of leaders in the past as indexed by the contemporary
global category of ‘corruption’ was, however, a feature of
Nepal’s pre-jana andolan period. Calling this ‘corruption’
obscures the deep roots that patrimonialism has in Nepal’s
political culture. Mahesh Regmi’s historiographic accounts
of the rent-seeking behaviour of tax collectors, and village
headmen in Nepal’s past showed that patronage has long
been a feature of state administration (Regmi 1971). It is
this cultural heritage that youth identify and question.
Despite the widespread influence of political parties on
the lives of young Nepalis, there is growing anti-political
or counter political sentiment that reflects a deepening
distrust with formal political institutions. Young Nepali
student activists must reconcile the legacy of patrimonialism in formal political institutions to a democratic ethos
that, they have been told, values accountability, transparency, and individual merit. Though belonging to a political
party is a near requirement for university students, there
is a growing trend among some of the educated to forgo
party activism. One activist with Bibiksheel Nepal, which is
a non-partisan organization, told us that “there is a saying:
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people do politics if they cannot do anything else,” that
is, youth who have ability and talent are more likely to
pursue them outside of formal political institutions. Even
those still engaged with political parties sometimes openly
question the direction their leadership is taking them.
Constituent Assembly, Constituent Power
A politics of identity in Nepal that pits a dominant hill
brahmin and chhetri elite against subordinated peoples
has become increasingly prominent since the early 1990s.
Tensions between caste and ethnic groups became amplified by international discourses of indigeneity, NGO
campaigns for social inclusion and, not least, the mobilization of nationalities by the Maoists during the People’s War
(Shneiderman 2013). Identity thus played a dominant role
in the debates about Nepal’s republican constitution after
the war (Lawoti 2012; Shneiderman and Tillin 2015). Some
students on the Tribhuvan University campus articulated
their desire for justice for Nepal’s marginalized communities and the view that restructuring would move the new
republic away from the centralizing tendencies of the past,
but for others there was a fear that constitutional restructuring would unleash deeper animosities and ultimately
lead to the dissolution of the state. The contest between
these views was passionate, adversarial, and partisan.
The politics of identity, framed very much by constitutional debates, crept into student politics. In addition to
the unions established by the dominant political parties,
competing ethnicity-based unions and the potential for
ethnicity-based antagonism emerged. A student leader of
the Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum union suggested:
This year student union elections are going to be
held and there may be definite chances of fighting, quarreling, strikes, violation, loss of lives, etc.
among the students. The present student union
revolution was based on Madhesi Andolan to prevent the country from more deterioration and also
for the unification of all student unions which
were in crisis due to the Nepali Congress and UML
affiliated student unions. All along, we took the
stand for the best unification along with indigenous
student groups and also [reached out to] students
who live in remote mountainous areas where they
do not have access of radio and TV and motor vehicles for day to day news about the elections.
This speaker’s prediction of campus violence was not born
out as the FSU elections he was referring to were canceled
by the university administration for the reasons we gave
earlier, but it shows that many students were sharply

critical of the caste hill Hindu elites that controlled the
dominant political parties. Some, like this speaker, were
drawn to alternative ethnicity-based student unions that
arm ethnicity-based political parties such as the Madhesi
Jana Adhikar Forum. But, the Congress and UML student
union groups we conducted focus groups with also had
participants from madhesi and adivasi janajati communities.
Even in those discussions, both a critical distance towards
Nepal’s main democratic institutions and an awareness of
the domination of political elites was present.
The view that political leaders exclude grassroots participation in party decisions is widespread, but the exclusion
of those marginalized by caste and ethnic minorities is
even more structurally determined. This speaker should
also be understood in the prevailing context as of May
2013. The Constituent Assembly (CA) that was elected
in 2008 following the demise of the monarchy failed to
agree on a new constitution for the country. In 2012, CA
members attempted to vote an extension of the CA term,
which the Supreme Court overturned because it violated
the interim constitution. The CA was then dissolved and
replaced with an all-party mechanism that was to plan
elections to a new CA. Some students questioned whether those elections would be held, noting that most other
democratic institutions, such as on municipal and village
levels, had been dormant since the period of the Maoist
people’s war. There was much doubt that the all-party
mechanism would ever devolve decision-making power
to democratic institutions that political elites could not
overtly control, which had been the case during the thirty
years of party-less, ’guided’ democracy of the panchayat
regime. Students feared a return to authoritarianism.
Fortunately, that pessimism appeared to be unfounded.
Elections to a second CA were held, relatively peacefully, in
2013, and the long-delayed election for local bodies was held
a year later. The newly-elected CA promulgated a revised
constitution after the 2015 earthquake, setting off several
months of chaos during a blockade of the Indian border organized to force more political representation for the madhesi community. The new constitution also laid the groundwork for the recently-concluded elections to a new National
Assembly to replace the CA, as well as seven new provincial
legislatures. In this context, there is a more expanded capacity for youth engagement with normative politics, as well as
a need for the critical distance they bring.
The diffusion of political power from the center to Nepal’s
formerly-peripheral provinces, regions, and municipalities
represents a departure from established patterns of political authority, provided that the new structures are not
subverted by the same interests that dominated political

institutions in the past. The blockade of the Indian border showed that the new constitution had overlooked the
linguistic, cultural, and territorial interests of the madhesi
and adivasi janajati minorities that previous constitutional
proposals had attempted to accommodate. The rise of caste
and ethnicity-based political organizations offers youth
alternative political identities and vehicles for mobilization.
The debates that produced this new constitutional context
were conducted both within the Assemblies and during the
elections that produced them. Nepali students rehearsed
these debates within and between their own organizations, or on the streets during the frequent strikes that
were called to protest the various models of federalism
that were being proposed. The Unified Communist Party
of Nepal (Maoist), for example, insisted on a fourteen state
model that consisted of many of the ethnic ‘autonomous
zones’ that had been established during their insurgency,
and it was a deadlock over this proposal that led to the
demise of the Constituent Assembly in 2012. Knowledge
about this proposal, which was modified repeatedly by
the Maoists before it was finally abandoned three years
later, was widespread among students. Madhesi and adivasi
janajati organizations embraced the model as it was seen
as the best way to assert their claims to greater equality
against the dominant elites, while students in mainstream
organizations warned that the model would lead to
communitarian violence and an inequitable distribution
of natural resources. The elections of the new CA in 2013
reduced the Maoists to the political opposition and their
proposal for ethnicity-based provinces was abandoned.
Despite this, Nepali youth remained openly engaged with
a confrontation of counter-hegemonic visions of how their
country should be structured. Sometimes that confrontation became a feature in the political subjectivity of
individual youths. In one focus group discussion held with
students from mixed political backgrounds, one young
man responded to another speaker who had just criticized
the Maoist federalism proposal:
I do partially agree with previous speaker and to
some extent I do not agree with them. The Maoists
have raised the issue of identity, but they raised
this issue in negative way. As Nepal is a multi-ethnic, multilingual, and multi-cultural country, all
ethnic groups and classes should be identified.
The Maoists are proposing single-ethnic identity in their federal structure rather it should be
multi-ethnic identity. Power shouldn’t be given to a
single ethnic group in a federal province. All ethnic
groups should be able to live freely without any
domination of a single ethnic group.
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The recognition that Nepal had been dominated by a
single dominant group in the past is recognized by many,
but ethnicity-based federalism inspired the fear that bare
ethnic majorities would be able to, in turn, dominate the
provinces that take their name. This view was widespread
among many students except those belonging to madhesi
or adivasi janajati organizations, but it reflected a misunderstanding of the federalism proposal as it had evolved
in the Constituent Assembly (Adikhari and Gellner 2016).
Politically, the Maoists lost the fight for their vision of a
new Nepal in the 2013 Constituent Assembly election and
the sometime violent madhesi blockade that followed
the introduction of the new constitution in 2015 failed to
produce the amendments that the movement was seeking.
The project of accommodating Nepal’s cultural diversity in
its political structures is not complete.
Street activism continues to be a frequent political tactic
for pressing for minority rights, and a resort to the battlefield is still possible, but so far most confrontations take
place within imperfect constitutional bodies developed
at great cost in the past. Normative democratic institutions, according to agonistic theory, are symbolic spaces
on which these confrontations are carried out and where,
despite their antagonism, these visions can be legitimately voiced (Mouffe 2005). Youth were at the forefront of
the street movements that played such a critical part in
Nepal’s recent history, but translating the successes of
those movements into institutional forms has proven more
difficult. In that process of translation, older generations
and older models of ‘political culture’ may reassert control.
At the same time, policies on education, health care, infrastructure development, and employment that concern
youth cannot be determined in street movements.
The struggle to build democratic institutions in Nepal is,
as in all democratic polities, an uneven process that shifts
between traditional political practices and the potential for
ideal democratic deliberation. Having a voice in normative political institutions in Nepal is still very new, and
that tension is a much more recent experience. Youth are
becoming political agents at a time when political agency is
being transformed. This places them at a critical juncture
between the past and future. Though the 2015 constitution
prescribes a new institutional framework, there is still
much to done. Local political bodies need to empowered,
new provinces need to be named, new ministries created
and, perhaps most importantly, the critical political process
of development and national identity need to continue.
Democratic institutions are imperfect, evolving, and subject
to manipulation by powerful elites, but they provide a
framework for progressive change. The critical distance
that Nepali youth bring to bear on democratic institutions
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has the potential to transform them from within, and even
the avowed a-politicism of many youth is a silent interlocution into normative political debate.
Conclusion
One of the assumptions of representative democracy is
that constitutional consensus on a form of government is
grounded in the constituent power of the peoples being governed. This constituent power is evident along a
continuum of political practices through which people demand and debate those forms, from civil violence, unrest,
demonstrations, and strikes, through social and political
institutions of governance. Legitimate constitutional
forms, assuming that they are not dictated by elites in a coercive manner, are not independent from the constituent
power that produces it. In the years following the Loktantra Andolan, Nepal has striven for constitutional consensus
amid stark ideological and political identity differences in
an attempt to set the republic along a new path that breaks
with its oppressive past. Even with the controversies surrounding the current republican constitution, it is a radical
departure from the Hindu monarchy that authorized elite
domination in the past. This search for constitutional consensus is an antagonistic contest between ideological and
identity-based interests that would mean that any consensus is necessarily contingent on the shifting political
practices that produce it.
Nepali youth have contributed disproportionately to this
constituent power through their political practices. Nepali
students and youth participated with alacrity in street level demonstrations, strikes, and political campaigns; they
were a crucial resource for the ‘People’s War,’ in the madhesi as well as adivasi janajati movements, and are articulated into political party structures that produced several
generations of democratic political leaders. In the past,
efforts to mobilize youth have been aimed at integrating
them as useful assets in the service of Nepalese political
institutions, but as we have argued above, politically active
youth today should be understood as an active constituent
force that is in counterpoint to normative political institutions. The National Youth Policy can be understood as yet
another attempt to harness this resource for the purpose
of nation building, but it’s lack of impact on Nepali youth
reveals the uneven capacity the Nepali state to mobilize it.
The Nepali youth we have spoken to are drawn into what
they identify as the political culture of the organizations
they belong to, but at the same time many are critical the
corruption, nepotism, and domination of earlier generations. That critical awareness has long been a factor in
Nepal’s political transformation, and may yet produce the
political and social change that youth imagine and desire.
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